Letter from Manila: Negotiating at Gunpoint

November 15, 2022

By Greg Rushford

Manila, Philippines — It’s past time to sound some national security alarm bells. The Philippines, America’s oldest treaty ally in the Pacific, has been facing economic and military pressures from China. Beijing’s bullying has been intensifying gradually for more than thirty years. The hard truth is that the Chinese are winning.

The PLA Navy — clearly contrary to international law, as determined by an international tribunal in The Hague in 2016 — has been preventing Philippine fishers from casting their nets in the South China Sea. Chinese predatory fishing in Philippine waters has been devastating to corals and other marine life, while also causing Philippine fish stocks to drop more than 60 percent. And now, adding insult to injury, China has been exporting Philippine fish it has stolen — back to the Philippines.

The same PLA Navy has been preventing the Philippines from developing much-needed oil and gas resources in Philippine waters — notably including Reed Bank, which is within the Philippines’ continental shelf and is believed to have the energy resources needed to keep the country’s electricity grids running. Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China, has given his coast guard permission to shoot to kill any Philippine exploration vessels that interfere with China’s ambitions to develop Reed Bank’s resources. Former Philippine Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio observes that Xi’s bullying “clearly violates international law.”

Xi is essentially demanding that Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. negotiate away his country’s energy independence — at gunpoint. As Eduardo Mañalac told me, because of the political risk associated with the Chinese military intimidation around Philippine oil-exploration fields, no major western market-oriented oil company will touch the Philippines. Xi is basically asking Marcos to agree to negotiate only with Chinese state-owned drilling concerns which do not pretend to adhere to international standards of financial transparency.

Mañalac is a respected former president of the Philippine National Oil Company, and a former senior official in the Philippines’ energy department. His concerns over the corrosive effects of Chinese corruption are well-taken in leading international energy circles. And in Manila’s legal circles, the scent of scandal is in the air, fueled by pending civil litigation alleging high-level governmental cronyism, and also criminal complaints alleging graft.

If Xi Jinping succeeds in intimidating the new Philippine president, who has only been in office since June, China will develop and control a key part of the Philippine energy sector. The Philippines will have been shamed — and residents of cities like Manila will have Xi to thank, every time they turn their lights on.

It’s worth looking back briefly at how one of America’s most important security allies has landed in such a predicament. Last month, I spent two intense weeks of mostly off-the-record talks with the usual journalistic sources, ranging from ordinary citizens who chafe at Chinese bullying to the higher echelons from the worlds of national security, diplomacy, politics, law, and business. The gist of what I picked up points to one bottom line: a lack of necessary political will at the presidential levels in both Washington and Manila, dating to the early 1990s.

What Happens when the Yankees Really Do Go Home

In 1991, the United States Air Force and Navy evacuated the large U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay. Volcanic eruptions from nearby Mt. Pinatubo that covered both bases in ash were the immediate impetus for the pullout. But the real reason involved insular-looking Philippine domestic politics. That, plus American stubbornness during endless negotiations over the usual suspect: money.

Then-President Corazon Aquino and some of her aides who wore anti-American chips on their shoulders had made it plain that Uncle Sam just wasn’t welcome anymore. And the Yankees, fed up with years of negotiations over basing rights that went nowhere, were happy to go home.

While over the years, the Philippines has succeeded commendably in turning the former U.S. bases into one of the most thriving hubs of economic growth in Southeast Asia. But watchful military eyes in Beijing soon perceived that the Philippines was left defenseless.

In 1995, the Philippines discovered that the Chinese navy had seized Mischief Reef, a tiny speck in the South China Sea that is part of the Philippines’ continental shelf. Chinese officials insisted that that they were just erecting fishing shelters. Manila and its neighbors in ASEAN fussed for awhile, but basically shrugged.

The PLA Navy on the Move

Visiting Manila in 1998, I saw Philippine reconnaissance photos that showed that the Chinese had erected military features on Mischief Reef, gun turrets, and such. When those photos hit the Manila papers, there was a public outcry (at least involving ordinary Filipinos, if not so much business elites with their eyes on doing business with a rising China).

Meanwhile, officials in then-President Bill Clinton’s State Department were not much bothered. Don’t worry: China lacks the resources necessary to project real military power, I was told.

The Clinton White House was busy extending a helping hand to a mainland China that wanted to get back on its feet and join the market-oriented global economy, after decades of economic mismanagement by the Communist Party of China. Clinton saw a potential peaceable economic partner, not a strategic rival-in-waiting.

From 2001 to 2008, the drift continued. President George W. Bush, his hands full with Iraq and Afghanistan, never seemed to focus on the future dangers associated with Chinese mischief in the South China Sea.

As had his predecessor Clinton, Bush welcomed China into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Inside WTO headquarters in Geneva, China quickly assumed the mantle of a responsible participant in multilateral negotiations, including those aimed at persuading governments to slash subsidies to their fishing fleets that were engaged in illegal fishing. But on the high seas, the Chinese fishing fleets kept doing ever more environmental damage. By 2016, marine biologists were warning that the South China Sea’s fish stocks were heading toward collapse.

An American President Blinks

By the time President Barack Obama, who sat in the Oval Office from 2009-2016, completed his eight years in office, the PLA Navy had taken near-total control of the South China Sea.  

The PLA Navy, of course, had its eyes on much more than fish. The story is now as familiar as it is disconcerting: how the Chinese created artificial islands out of white sand and coral in Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. What were once half-submerged specks in the sea are now modern Chinese naval and air bases. Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, and Subi Reef have hardened runways for jet fighters, sophisticated radars, jamming equipment, lasers, anti-aircraft missile launchers, and more.

The United States Navy, which specializes in conventional surface warfare — but isn’t so adept at waging political warfare — watched America’s former military dominance of the South China Sea slip away. Beijing’s weapons of choice were a mixture of the usual sleight-of-hand: propaganda and disinformation proclaiming Chinese good intentions, sand dredgers, and coast guard ships that were accompanied by swarms of maritime militia “fishing” fleets. 

While all this was underway, Xi assured China’s neighbors that his military would not weaponize the South China Sea. That was, of course, a lie.  But the disinformation worked. As Seth Jones has written, China took the South China Sea “without firing a shot.”

Obama watched all this happen. He promised senior Philippine officials I’ve spoken with that America would not just stand idly by. But that’s what he did.

Washington Starts to Pay Attention

It wasn’t until 2020 that an American secretary of state, Michael Pompeo, working with David Stillwell, a respected Asian hand who headed State’s East Asian Affairs bureau, stated publicly that the United States recognized that the Chinese maritime aggression was in violation of international law. Last month in Manila, I was reminded several times how welcome that statement was. The State Department had signaled that America was starting to get serious about protecting its friends in the Pacific.

Indeed, in April 2020, the U.S. Navy helped Malaysia fend off Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militias, which were trying to bully the Malaysians out of exploring for oil and gas in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone.  This is still being talked about in Manila’s national security circles.

As Philippine investigative reporter and author Marites Vitug has noted approvingly, “three American warships and an Australian frigate conducted a joint exercise near the site” of Malaysia’s exploration activities. Vitug also pointed out that when faced with such resolve, the Chinese intruders backed off.

I still cannot report that America has yet put into operation what could be called a truly sophisticated political-military-diplomatic maritime strategy. But some steps in the right direction have continued on President Joe Biden’s watch.

Last month, to cite just one of several recent encouraging developments, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson announced that “the United States has now made available $100 million in foreign military financing in part for the Philippine military to use as it wishes.”

Searching for Presidential Political Will in Manila

But how does one help an ally who lacks the political will to defend its own sovereignty? Former Philippine President Benigno Aquino, Jr. clearly had the necessary determination to stand up to Chinese bullying. In 2013, Aquino filed a challenge in The Hague, asserting that Chinese aggression in the South China Sea violated Beijing’s obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. And on July 12, 2016, Aquino’s move became a resounding success, when an UNCLOS tribunal ruled that China had acted illegally. It was “an overwhelming victory for the Philippines,” as Greg Poling noted in his recent, very well-received book, On Dangerous Ground.

“The judges agreed that China had illegally destroyed the marine environment through clam harvesting, intentionally created the risk of collision [with] foreign ships, and prevented the Philippines from accessing the resources of its EEZ and continental shelf,” Poling wrote.  Moreover, “they berated China for building artificial islands while the arbitration was underway.”

But there was one problem with the tribunal’s finding: it was issued twelve days after Rodrigo Duterte had succeeded Aquino as president. And it turned out that Duterte, a man who enjoyed projecting an image of a tough guy in the political arena, wasn’t so tough after all when it came to standing up to bullies in Beijing. The Philippine “strongman” refused to enforce his country’s legal victory — leaving Philippine fishing communities hanging, and potential oil and gas exploration, especially in Reed Bank, subject to the PLA Navy’s intimidation.

Just one 2018 press release issued by the historically weak Philippine Coast Guard showed the atmosphere of subservience that Duterte nourished.

Duterte and Xi Jinping had signed a maritime cooperation agreement, the release noted. So the Philippine Coast Guard had gotten busy making friends with China’s Coast Guard.  Translation:  that meant that the two coast guards bonded when they got together in Guangzhou.  Readers who have ever experienced Chinese hospitality will have already imagined the partying and entertainment.

Afterwards, the Philippine Coast Guard issued a press release that celebrated its fraternal ties with the same Chinese Coast Guard that had taken control of Philippine fishing grounds. “The two sides noted the positive outcomes of the bilateral relations and expressed their willingness to further deepen cooperation by conducting port visits, joint exercises, personnel exchange and training, and utilization of hotline communication,” the Philippine press release enthused. 

The Philippine Coast Guard now has new leadership said not to be subservient to China. Whether that’s true or not, a Coast Guard spokesman told me last month that he was not authorized to talk about Chinese maritime aggression.

Political Risk

Meanwhile, on Duterte’s watch, Philippine government officials close to him allegedly pressured two American oil majors, Shell and Chevron, to sell their shares in the Philippines’ Malampaya gas field to a crony of Duterte’s who has a reputation of being pro-Chinese. This was “extremely suspicious,” notes Eduardo Mañalac, the former president of the Philippine National Oil Company.

Malampaya is important for two reasons. It supplies perhaps 40 percent of Manila’s electric grid. And it is running out of gas reserves, which makes future exploration on Reed Bank, and elsewhere very important.

Mañalac is not the only reputable Philippine critic of the Malampaya sale. Reuben Torres, a well-regarded former executive secretary to former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, is pressing litigation that alleges that the transaction was of dubious legality. 

And the Philippines’ Office of the Ombudsman is reported to be looking into separate charges that the Malampaya transaction was criminal. 

Whatever the truth, the whiff of political risk is hanging in the political air that Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the new Philippines president known better as “Bong Bong Marcos,” has inherited. The message to international oil majors is that Philippine energy sector is tilted in favor of Xi and the PLA Navy. Such a lack of a level playing field explains why only the Chinese government has expressed interest in exploring for oil in Chinese-controlled Philippine waters.

So how will this story end? The answer depends upon how Bong Bong Marcos responds to the bullies from Beijing.  As Greg Poling has observed, while the Chinese have been winning, they haven’t yet “won.”  

I believe that despite the previous years of mistakes in Washington, involving both Democratic and Republican presidents, the new Philippine leader will have America’s backing — if he genuinely wants it.

Stay tuned.

From Central Europe: An Intelligence Lesson for Americans

By Greg Rushford

I visited Prague last month, looking for insights into Russian and Chinese intelligence strategies in this important capital city in central Europe. As it turned out, the Czech Republic’s principal counterintelligence agency — the Security Information Service, better known by its acronym BIS — made it easy. On December 3, 2018, the BIS released its latest annual public report on secret foreign influence operations that had targeted the Czech Republic. 

Unsurprisingly, the BIS spooks pointed their fingers in a familiar direction: various Russian “active measures” aimed at advancing Vladimir Putin’s foreign agenda of disruption; and espionage operations emanating from Xi Jinping’s Beijing. Well-informed observers were quick to commend the BIS for its professionalism in releasing such an apolitical, fact-based report. “Compared to most of the security institutions in Central Europe,” noted the respected Prague-based European Values Think Tank, the BIS “managed to describe Russian and Chinese intelligence activities in the Czech Republic in a remarkable detail.” 

But that certainly would be news to the overwhelming majority of Americans. As usual, the major cable television channels where a majority of Americans get their news, very little of which is foreign — Fox, MSNBC, CNN — had nothing. Even the New York Times, which prides itself as the gold standard for foreign news reporting, ran only a skimpy Associated Press filler that consisted of just seven sparse sentences. That wire service said that the BIS had uncovered a Russian cyber-espionage operation that had targeted the Czech foreign ministry. There was no mention that BIS had also identified Chinese important espionage operations in the Czech Republic. There was scant mention of why the story was an important one — a core journalistic principle that is taught at the high-school level. 

This is not surprising. Even the best American editors are prone to downplay any story that wouldn’t immediately be perceived by readers in the heartland as relevant to their daily lives.  Why should people in Peoria care about what happens in Prague? 

As it happens, there are ample reasons. Those reasons begin with an appreciation of history — and the consequences of being ill-informed about disturbing trends in global politics. Furthermore, reading current political news from Prague helps provide valuable context that offers opportunities for further reflection on the chaotic current political environment in the United States. 

But that’s getting ahead of the story, which begins with a brief overview of ongoing security threats at the behest of the Russians and Chinese that the Czech intelligence service has exposed.

Familiar Russian and Chinese Mischief

Moscow-directed influence and disinformation operations against the Czech Republic, the BIS reported, “were a part of the general Russian” strategy of weakening the vital NATO alliance and the European Union internally. Perhaps the most disturbing detail in the report: The Czech ministry of foreign affairs was targeted by a brazen Russian cyber-espionage campaign that began in 2016 and was detected the next year. By then, the Russian intelligence operatives had hacked into more than 150 diplomatic electronic mailboxes, including those of the Czech foreign minister. To experienced observers, such operations have a familiar, if brazen, ring. Moscow’s traditional subversive “active measures” of covert dirty tricks have long been aimed at weakening the institutions that sustain and protect liberal democracies. 

By contrast, the BIS reported that the Chinese have been focusing on the classic espionage business of stealing secrets. The Czech counterintelligence officials said they had “identified a worrying development in the area of Chinese activities…that as a whole pose a threat to the Czech Republic in the field of economic, scientific and technical espionage.” Toward that end, the BIS noted that China “has almost unlimited funds at its disposal and is able to offer these funds to foreign companies in exchange for access to intellectual property or entry to foreign markets.” 

It doesn’t take much reflection to see why American readers should find the BIS findings relevant. As the Czech Republic is an important member of the NATO alliance, any attempts to weaken that country are also of national security concern to the United States. More specifically, even the most casual consumers of news would recognize that the Russians have also been running similar cyber-espionage operations in the United States. And the reports of the Chinese spying aimed at stealing valuable intellectual property mirror news of Beijing’s economic espionage activities that also target the United States. 

Two Presidents: One Mentality

But while the BIS report was important for its insights into foreign intelligence operations, reading it offers a stark reminder of the (disturbing) similarities between current political trends in both the Czech Republic and the United States.  Specifically, Americans who read about Czech President Milos Zeman cannot help but reflect upon U.S. President Donald Trump and his America First agenda.

Zeman is called the European Trump, and for good reason. And his reaction to the BIS disclosures about his friends in Moscow and Beijing was, well, Trumplike, which I’ll explain shortly. But for context, consider how much alike the two presidents are.

For context, consider this recent report about Zeman in Politico: “He’s a septuagenarian who dislikes Muslims, the media and migrants and loves Vladimir Putin,” reporter Siegfried Mortkowitz noted. “He’s detested by urban dwellers and liberal elites who see him as a national embarrassment and a menace to values they hold dear.” 

Other European analysts have noted how Zeman’s supporters outside the major cities are hardly bothered by his tendency to speak crudely, as they also tend to speak the same language of resentment. Zeman, who was elected to a second term in January 2018, is also loathe to apologize for anything, preferring instead to double down in the face of protests from the detested elites. 

Surely, every American — no matter his or her political persuasion — who has read this far would have already been reminded of Donald Trump. 

The parallels between the two presidents are simply impossible to ignore, beginning with their attitude toward a free press.

Chafing at a free press

Trump has invested considerable political energy in trying to discredit the so-called purveyors of “fake news.” He has famously branding the media as the “enemy of the people” — with no apologies for the fact that using such language puts him in some very distasteful historical company indeed.

Zeman also chafes at his country’s free press, once joking about “liquidating” journalists with Vladimir Putin, a man with expertise on that subject. And in October last year, Zeman reacted to the murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in Saudi Arabia’s consulate in Istanbul this way: “I love journalists, that’s why I may organize a special banquet for them this evening at the Saudi embassy.” 

[Anyone who doubts that the Czech Republic has a free press would profit from visiting Czech Press Photo 2018, which is now on display in Prague’s Old Town Hall. Sponsored by the minister of culture and the mayor of Prague, the exhibition treats visitors to an impressive display of the best news photographs and documentaries produced by the country’s journalists in the past year. One of the most compelling: a spot news photo of a bare-breasted Ukrainian activist who shamed Zeman during his January 2018 presidential campaign. She was shouting: “Zeman is Putin’s slut.”]

Shared covert political support from Moscow

Zeman, who was the only European head of state who openly supported Trump’s 2016 presidential candidacy, has never hid his pro-Moscow sentiments. And like Trump, Zeman has been dogged by convincing evidence that the Russians covertly supported his political campaigns.   

Zeman has close associates who are suspected of dubious dealings with Russians who have connections in the Kremlin. So does Trump, although his personal involvement remains a matter of ongoing investigations. 

When Trump was reminded by Fox News host Bill O’Reilly in February 2017 that “Putin’s a killer,” he shot back: “There are a lot of killers. We have a lot of killers. Well, you think our country’s so innocent?”

Zeman has accepted Russia’s 2015 seizing of Crimea. Donald Trump has just said — incredibly — that the Soviet Union did the right thing when it invaded Afghanistan in 1979. And just the other day, Trump even said that he trusted the leaders of communist China more than he did his Democratic opponents in the U.S. Congress. 

And while each president is loathe to utter any words that might cause offense to Putin, they certainly are not shy when it comes to scorn directed toward the European Union and NATO. It is difficult to give either president the benefit of the doubt for having good intentions, when their statements dovetail with Moscow’s propaganda machine. 

A mutual distrust of their country’s professional intelligence services

Perhaps nowhere are the parallels more striking than when it comes to the attitude displayed by the two presidents toward their country’s professional intelligence services. The cadre of intelligence officers at the BIS, as do their non-partisan counterparts in America’s CIA, are steeped in the importance of speaking truth to power. But of course, this is not always appreciated in the highest corridors of political power. 

It is a matter of record that when U.S. intelligence agencies reported they had found disturbing evidence of Russian interference in 2016 aimed at promoting his presidential candidacy, Trump repeatedly denigrated the findings. Trump at one point even called the heads of the CIA and FBI “political hacks.”

Zeman reacted in similar fashion to last month’s BIS report that detailed Russian- and Chinese covert strategies aimed at undermining Czech national security. The BIS had given him “wrong” data, he said. The Czech president also insisted that the quality of BIS’s intelligence analyses had been “deteriorating,” reported RadioFreeEurope/Radio Liberty. Czech intelligence officers were “bozos,” Zeman ranted.

Last May, Zeman even blocked the promotion of BIS chief Michal Koudelka to the rank of general. Koudelka is a professional intelligence officer who has developed an expertise on Russian influence operations. 

The importance of understanding history

Beyond the current political similarities, Americans have important historical reasons to be more interested in what goes on in Prague. In the late 1930s the America Firsters of that era were infamously slow to recognize the growing threat posed to the western democracies by fascism. In 1938, historians recall that perhaps only three percent of an ill-informed American public believed that America should fight to defend our democratic allies, France and the United Kingdom, from Adolf Hitler’s conquest. That changed suddenly, of course, when America was later drawn into World War II after the December 7, 1941, Japanese sneak attack on Pearl Harbor.

But the global conflict had become inevitable in February 1939 when Hitler seized the German-speaking Sudetenland, in the western part of was then called Czechoslovakia. The Nazis took Prague the following month — but people in America’s heartland mostly slept. They still didn’t understand why what had happened in Prague, mattered to them.

This isn’t just ancient history from the Czech point of view, either. Last month in Prague, I was reminded of how people in Prague still cringe at the memory of Neville Chamberlain’s September 1938 appeasement in Munich. The Czechs were shocked when the British leader agreed to let Hitler take the Sudetenland. 

Chamberlain had hoped that Hitler’s thirst for conquest would be satisfied by feeding it. As the renowned intelligence scholar Christopher Andrew relates in his newest book, The Secret World, Chamberlain had been warned by his own counterintelligence service, MI5, that the appeasement would produce the opposite effect. The British prime minister disregarded the secret intelligence — more politely than Milos Zeman’s current intemperate rejection of the BIS reports, but just as unwise. 

Today, the Czechs still remember what they call the Munich Betrayal. And every time that Donald Trump speaks respectfully of Putin — and disrespectfully of the NATO alliance — the Czechs have a familiar feeling. They have good reason to worry whether, if push comes to shove with the Russian Bear, America will still have their backs. 

Message to American news editors: Step up your game. 

Obama’s “Deja vu” Vietnam Diplomacy

Obama’s “Déjà vu” Vietnam Diplomacy

 A high-stakes diplomatic drama is playing out between the United States and Vietnam. While the focus is on enhancing bilateral economic ties in the ongoing Trans-Pacific Partnership negotiations, the economics are also related to broader security- and human rights issues. This article has some fresh news to report on what’s going on behind the scenes: What the ruling Politburo in Hanoi has decided about deepening its economic ties with the major powers. What Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang and U.S. President Barack Obama had to say to each other during their July 25 White House meeting in the Oval Office. Who else was in the room — and why that was important.

There is also background information to report that sheds light on the intense pressures that U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman has been bringing to bear on Vietnam, notably last week in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. On Aug. 22-23, Froman had private talks with his Vietnamese counterpart, Vu Huy Hoang, on the sidelines of the 19th round of the TPP trade talks, which are continuing this week in Brunei. Washington has been playing an intimidation game, pressuring Hanoi to accept an economic deal that is clearly not in Vietnam’s best interests — and just might get away with it.

But it’s not the hard news that captivates, but rather, the déjà vu feeling of another historical turning point in U.S.-Vietnamese relations. On Aug 30, 1945 — 68 years to the day, it turns out, that the TPP’s 19th round of negotiations will conclude this Friday in Brunei — Ho Chi Minh wrote the first of several letters to U.S. President Harry Truman. Uncle Ho sought Truman’s support for Vietnamese aspirations to gain independence from French colonial rule. The letters went unanswered, as the Truman administration’s higher priority involved helping the French recover from the devastations of World War II.

“In historical terms, it was a monumental decision by Truman, and like so many that U.S. presidents would make in the decades to come, it had little to do with Vietnam herself — it was all about America’s priorities on the world stage,” historian Fredrik Logevall has observed in his acclaimed Embers of War. The concerns of more enlightened observers in the U.S. State Department and in the intelligence community, who worried about the consequences of getting on the wrong side of the battle against colonialism, were overridden.

When they met in the Oval Office last month, President Sang displayed a keen sense of history when he gave Obama a copy of one of Uncle Ho’s letters to Truman. Hanoi has good reason to worry that the top Obama White House priority, once again, is not really focused on the Vietnamese economy.

In the TPP trade talks, the White House has been fighting tooth and nail on behalf of the protectionist U.S. textile lobby — Obama’s loyal allies who have supported him in his two successful presidential races. The top priority of the (globally uncompetitive) U.S. mills is denying Vietnam more access to protected U.S. clothing and footwear markets in a TPP trade deal.

As in the late 1940s, a few enlightened U.S. diplomats (quietly) and intelligence officials (very quietly) have now let their concerns be known around Washington. But Washington’s seasoned Asia hands find themselves basically sidelined by the White House domestic political priorities, much as their predecessors were nearly seven decades ago.

Meanwhile, President Sang, on behalf of the ruling Politburo, had his own message to deliver to Obama last month.

To better understand the nuanced blend current spot news and history, let’s begin with that White House meeting.

Spinning Oval Office diplomacy

When it comes to diplomacy, sometimes what the public sees is true — just not the whole picture. Consider the video that the White House posted on its website on July 25. Viewers see Sang and Obama meeting alone in the Oval Office, sitting in armchairs in front of a fireplace, each wearing appropriate dark power suits with muted ties. The image that the White House spinmeisters — who also put the video on You Tube — intended to convey recalls famous historical one-on-one diplomatic talks at the highest level: Nixon with Mao, or Roosevelt and Stalin.

But the Obama-Sang meeting was hardly a Roosevelt-Stalin like moment. It was a scripted, ceremonial occasion, typical of how American presidents have come to host visiting foreign dignitaries in recent years.

An unpublished photo shot by someone else in the room with a wide-angle lens shows that Sang had nine men in the Oval Office with him. Trade Minister Hoang was there, along with Agriculture Minister Cao Duc Phat and the head of Vietnam’s presidential office, Dao Viet Trung. Vietnamese Ambassador to the United States Nguyen Quoc Cuong also was present, as was Lt. Gen. To Lam. Gen. Lam is the deputy minister of Public Security, and formerly headed the ministry’s counter-intelligence department. Lam is also a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee.

With so many watchers — not all of them necessarily loyal to President Sang’s own supporters in the Politburo — no Vietnamese president would be positioned to engage in substantive bargaining.

A sense of history

Perhaps the three most interesting Vietnamese officials present were the translator, Pham Xuan Hoang An; Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, and Colonel General Nguyen Chi Vinh, the deputy minister of national defense. These men carry a sense of history with them — and a longstanding serious professional interest in U.S.-Vietnamese diplomacy. To experienced Vietnamese watchers, the news that An, Vinh and Minh were in the Oval Office will convey a sense of Vietnamese seriousness.

Interpreter An’s father, Pham Xuan An, was perhaps the most important communist spy during the Vietnam War. An’s cover was as a reporter for western news outlets, including Reuters and Time magazine. This complicated man was made a general after the North Vietnamese victory in 1975. But then Gen. An was also detained in a camp for “reeducation” for a year, because he was suspected as being too close to the Americans.

In fact, An loved America (he helped one of the CIA’s most important assets escape when the communists took Saigon). But after the war, the spy explained to his American friends that his top priority had always been working for his country’s independence. An’s double life was the subject of Larry Berman’s fascinating Perfect Spy, published in 2007. Now, An’s son, translator Pham Xuan Hoang An, works in Vietnam’s consulate in San Francisco. Like his father, the younger An is a man who knows both countries very well.

While Colonel Gen. Nguyen Chi Vinh is hardly a household name in America, he is well known to Vietnamese watchers. His father, Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh, was Vietnam’s second-ever general, after Vo Nguyen Giap. Gen. Thanh was the mastermind of the coordinated uprisings in nearly every major South Vietnamese urban center during the Tet Lunar New Year festivities in January of 1968. The Tet Offensive did not succeed in a military sense. But it is credited with being the proverbial last straw for the fed-up American public, which realized that the White House claims that the communists were on the verge of defeat were false.

Vinh is a member of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, and formerly headed the military intelligence department known (and feared) as Tong Cuc 2. Veteran Hong Kong-based foreign correspondent Greg Torode has called Vinh Vietnam’s wily “Old Fox,” a man who is generally regarded as “Vietnam’s shrewdest strategic thinker.”

Vinh has been a key actor in Vietnam’s delicate balancing act involving major powers with security interests in the Pacific. He has been an important player in a variety of sensitive issues: countering Chinese intimidation in the South China Sea while simultaneously establishing military ties with Beijing; submarine and other weapons purchases from Russia; and also increasing U.S.-Vietnamese military cooperation. Vinh, who is well known in both Washington and Beijing, also showed up earlier this month for private talks with senior defense officials in Tokyo (who also have good reasons to worry about Chinese continuing aggressive moves in the Pacific).

Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh also has a famous father. Nguyen Co Thach was Vietnam’s foreign minister from 1980 – 1991, where he worked unsuccessfully to normalize ties with the defeated Americans. Like his father, Foreign Minister Minh has a reputation as being keenly aware of the strategic importance of developing closer ties with the United States, by way of countering undue Chinese influence.

Minh related candidly at a Council of Foreign Relations event in 2011 that he had been full of “hatred” during the war, when as a child he endured the U.S. bombing of Hanoi. But ever since he joined the Vietnamese diplomatic service after the 1975 communist victory, Minh — like his father — has focused his own career upon finding ways to forge closer ties with Vietnam’s former war enemy.

Obama’s Diplomatic Team

While the July 25 Sang-Obama White House meeting was a tightly scripted affair, there was at least one moment of spontaneity, where Obama briefly reached out to strike a personal rapport with his Vietnamese guest. When U.S. and foreign “pool” journalists were admitted to the Oval Office for the usual photo opportunity, they shouted some questions to the two presidents. Obama ignored them, but was overheard whispering to Sang, “reporters are the same everywhere.”

A White House press aide declines to discuss who else was in the meeting on either the Vietnamese- or the American side. Pool reporters who were let in for the photo ceremony saw two U.S. officials besides National Security Adviser Susan Rice: Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, and U.S. trade negotiator Froman.

Pritzker, an Obama fundraiser from Chicago, is new to foreign affairs. Her Commerce Department is the agency that is widely resented in Vietnam for inflicting protectionist anti-dumping tariffs on the Vietnamese shrimp and catfish industries. And Froman, although also close to Obama, brings more of a domestic political focus to his job than genuine foreign policy experience. (Any diplomatic heavy lifting that was done would have been done a few blocks away from the White House, at Secretary John Kerry’s State Department. Kerry, a Vietnam War veteran, hosted the Vietnamese presidential delegation on July 24. He was in New York when the Vietnamese visitors met with Obama the next day.)

Scripted or not, still, important signals were sent by both presidents.

A Message from the Politburo

The Vietnamese delegation made it clear to Obama — as they had a day earlier in a meeting with trade negotiator Froman — that they were sincere about attaching a very high priority to advancing economic ties with the United States in the TPP negotiations, according to well-informed Vietnamese officials and also senior U.S. diplomatic officials who asked not to be identified.

Carlyle Thayer, a respected Vietnamese watcher who has excellent high-level connections in Hanoi, explains. Thayer, who is affiliated with the Australian Defense Force Academy, says he has seen a copy of an April 10 resolution drafted by the ruling Politburo, which has not yet been publicly released. “It makes economic integration with all the major powers Vietnam’s top priority, over all other forms of integration, including security,” Thayer reports.

In the Oval Office, President Sang stressed to Obama what Vietnamese officials have been saying for the last three years: that if the TPP negotiations are to succeed, Vietnam will need economic incentives — mainly substantial additional access to U.S. clothing- and footwear markets, which are currently encumbered with high tariffs. Vietnam’s main problem with the TPP is that for the same past three years, the White House has held up progress in the negotiations by refusing to make serious tariff-slashing offers.

White House press officials decline to discuss Obama’s response to Sang. For public consumption the two presidents agreed to put out a (bland) public statement noting that they would instruct their aides to do their utmost to complete the TPP by the end of this year. (The White House said the same thing last year, and also in 2011. Froman has been telling people that this time, the administration really means it.)

Signals from Washington

What little detail is known about what Obama said during the meeting has been revealed by U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam David Shear, who spoke to a high-powered Vietnamese-American gathering in Washington, D.C.’s Virginia suburbs on August. 16.  Shear said that the Obama administration considers the TPP negotiations to be “extremely important.” But without “demonstrable progress on human rights” by Hanoi on human rights, “we will not be able to generate congressional support” for a TPP deal, the ambassador added.

Shear related that human rights had come up twice in the Obama-Sang meeting. The first, he said, was part of a general reference linking human rights as the key to enhanced economic and security ties.

According to the ambassador, the second reference to human rights came after Sang expressed Vietnam’s desire to purchase U.S. “lethal” weapons. “If you want to do that,” Shear said that Obama replied, “you’ve got to improve your human-rights practices.” (A full transcript of Shear’s remarks has not yet been posted on the U.S. embassy’s website.)

As Hanoi’s human-rights record is currently being compared unfavorably to Vietnam’s Asian neighbors — even notorious Cambodia has held elections, while Myanmar has been busy freeing its political prisoners — Obama’s point is well taken. The Politburo must be asking itself these days what benefits the country is getting by continuing to imprison more than 160 peaceable political prisoners, whose “crimes” were merely exercising their rights to free political speech and peaceable assembly.

But the same Politburo members who are on the defense on human rights must also be asking why they should sign onto a TPP deal that would offer Vietnam dubious economic benefits.

Secret “21st Century” negotiations

Some parts of the TPP negotiations, to be sure, would clearly be aimed at boosting the Vietnamese economy. Vietnam has been struggling with the politically difficult task of reforming the country’s famously inefficient state-owned enterprises for some two decades.

Vietnam’s SOEs basically are secretive black holes and a drag on more than a third of the country’s economy. When the Obama White House spins the TPP deal as a “high-standard, 21st century” deal that will set an enviable template for trade in the Asia-Pacific region, SOE reforms come immediately to mind.

But other than the self-serving slogans, the White House has been refusing to explain to the watching publics any details of what the Vietnamese are being asked to do. Ironically, the White House is demanding that the Vietnamese economy become more open to market-oriented economics, while classifying what that might entail as a state secret.

Enter “Yarn Backward”

What Hanoi wants most in the TPP is for the United States to slash its high tariffs on imported footwear and clothing. There is a sort of role reversal here. The commies in Hanoi are pressing for free-market access to protected American markets. The Americans are demanding state control. The economic notion is called “yarn forward,” but the economics are hardly forward looking.

As I’ve previously reported, the French 19th century colonialists required that their Vietnamese subjects supply the mother country with textiles. Such imperial preference schemes supported France’s economic domination of Indochina — and inspired Vietnam’s independence movement.

Now the Americans are demanding the same sort of arrangement in the TPP. Vietnam would only qualify for duty-free treatment on its clothing- and footwear exports to the United States if it bought yarn and fabrics from another TPP country — translation: from the declining mills in the U.S. South, not non-TPP countries like China.

It doesn’t take an economics degree to see the flaws. Nobody — beyond insular-looking U.S. mills that long ago lost their competitive edge in global markets — pretends it makes economic sense. Why would any White House pressure the likes of Levis or Gap to buy their (heavy) denim from U.S. suppliers and ship it across the Pacific to Southeast Asia? Why would Obama even think of trying to force giant underwear manufacturer Hanesbrands to stop supplying its Vietnamese manufacturing from Hanes’ established suppliers in China or Thailand? Why would any White House insist that it has the right to disrupt the global supply chains of such respected major American corporations?

U.S. Trade Representative Froman has refused repeated requests to explain exactly why “yarn forward” would be in Vietnam’s best economic interests.

I have also asked U.S. Ambassador Shear if he was able to point to any economic benefits to Vietnam in the yarn forward notion. Shear has been put in the diplomatically awkward position of defending the White House position on yarn forward to the Vietnamese. Shear declined to defend yarn forward’s economic rationale publicly. The ambassador referred the question back to trade negotiator Froman, who again declined comment.

[Ambassador Shear has a reputation as a thoughtful diplomat, albeit something of a team player. His deliberate non-answer could be interpreted as a diplomatic wink, conveying his distaste for the whole business. In private meetings with U.S. corporate executives, Shear has toed the Obama line, but his body language has suggested his discomfort.]

Meanwhile, the White House has been demanding that American clothing manufacturers turn over confidential information on how their global supply chains operate. Intimidated, the companies have mostly knuckled under. The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative even has a special web site for the companies to divulge their business secrets to the government. This access to the private proprietary data has given Froman and his aides the means to instruct the domestic industry where it can source their materials (the U.S. South) and where they can’t (China).

The American clothing importers are now scrambling behind the scenes to receive special exemptions for themselves from the White House. The corporate lobbyists are looking to protect at least parts of their global supply chains from White House interference.

Of course, even with the limited TPP carve-outs that the feds may grant, the rules would always still be subject to sudden change, depending upon unpredictable bureaucratic whims. The American companies could stop the whole business if they had the nerve to stop groveling — which they have never quite summoned in previous U.S. trade negotiations.

China Bashing

The White House unconvincingly denies that the TPP is part of an anti-China economic encirclement strategy. Yarn forward was first included in the U.S. preferential trade deal with Mexico in the early 1990s, and then to other Latin American countries. The idea then, as now, was to hold back Chinese and later, other Asian imports.

It has failed. The rules are so cumbersome that only about 17 percent of Latin American trade goes through the “yarn forward” rules. Companies mostly prefer to pay the tariffs rather than suffer the paperwork.

Relief for Africa

When the Africans were negotiating the Africa Growth and Opportunity Act with the United States in the 1990s, the congressional Black Caucus vehemently objected to yarn forward rules because the principle offended them. Congressmen like Charles Rangel, a Democrat who represents New York’s Harlem neighborhood, fumed that yarn forward reeked of colonialism. Moreover, Rangel protested, such rules were even racist. Consequently, the AGOA trade deal allows the Africans to buy their cotton and other fabrics from China, or anywhere, as long as the final clothes are “cut and sewn” in Africa. In the TPP negotiations, anything short of clean “cut and sew” rules for clothing would hold back Vietnam’s export potential.

Another bitter irony for Vietnam: These days Rep. Rangel and other African-American lawmakers are lobbying for Obama to force upon Vietnam the same yarn-forward rules they formerly attacked as colonial and racist. And Central American countries like the Dominican Republic, who aren’t in the TPP and want to keep Asian competitors at bay, are also piling on Vietnam.

Undeterred, in Brunei last week, trade negotiator Froman still insisted that strict yarn forward rules remained at the “core” of what the U.S. wants in the TPP. He continued to withhold from the public any real details of what was in the TPP, other than the spin that it would be a “high standard, 21st Century” trade template.

The smart money would bet that the Vietnamese will end up swallowing hard and accepting a watered-down TPP deal, giving them modest increased market access for shoes and clothes, while making minimal market-opening concessions to the Americans. Call that TPP Light.

But perhaps the shrewd Politburo operatives in Hanoi, or at least enough of them, have the same sort of determination as did their fathers’ generation. After all, the Vietnamese negotiators should understand that Obama is the one who needs a TPP deal most. Could the American president really allow the TPP to fail, just because the Vietnamese want to sell Americans more pairs of underwear, blue jeans, and sneakers?

Talk about a déjà vu feeling. In the 1940s, President Truman ignored prescient warnings from U.S. intelligence and diplomatic officials that it would be a big mistake for the United States to get on the wrong side of the struggle against colonialism. Now, President Obama pays little heed to warnings that it is unwise to risk important trade talks with Vietnam — and America’s standing in Asia — for parochial domestic politics.

Some people never seem to learn their history.