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Introduction to International Political Economy: the Wakefield Seminars (Class One)

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by Greg Rushford

May 20, 2020

Note to readers: The following is the first of three Zoom presentations, lightly edited and amplified, that I delivered this month to high school students at the Wakefield Country Day School in Huntly, VA. Huntly is tucked away in the scenic foothills of the Blue Ridge Mountains in Rappahannock County, Virginia, 70 miles west of Washington, D.C. Its population is 7,300 persons. 

The setting would seem to be as removed from global trade and its controversies as it gets. But the three Zoom sessions explained how the world — especially the GATT/World Trade Organization, which is presently under the most severe political attacks from various world capitals in seven decades — is tightly woven into the daily lives even in remote corners of America. 

In these three classes I tried to share some of the most valuable basic lessons that I’ve learned over the past half century — which go far beyond the pre-university level. I encourage readers to share them with friends and relatives who wonder what the fuss is all about, and why they should be greatly concerned where the controversies are headed.

(I also encourage American readers to bring these materials to the attention of their local Members of Congress. Both Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. House and Senate are currently standing by in a sort of passive ignorance while some of the world’s most valuable international institutions are being deliberately weakened. And a few me-first CEOs who are afraid to stick their political necks out might also benefit from seeing how easy it is to explain the benefits– and importance– of trade.) 

The first session was held on May 5:

Good morning. The inspiration for today’s class, the first of three, was a question on many American minds in these days of the coronavirus pandemic: Should we manufacture medicines right here in the USA, both to protect American jobs and ensure that we are not dependent upon the goodwill, or perhaps not, of foreigners to protect our public health? 

I’m not going to answer that, really. But by the time we finish the third class, I hope that each of you will be better equipped to think through such questions independently. I’m going to offer you a framework for analytic thinking aimed at giving you the “ammunition” you need to understand the reasoning behind such questions. And I’ll point you to some links and sources aimed at provoking further research and independent thinking— certain that your teachers here at Wakefield have already said over-and-over again is the point of any true education.

We’ll be talking about perhaps a new concept: Political Economy. That’s a term familiar to every economics professor you will have in college. 

Today, let’s concentrate on the economics part, focusing on some simple-but-very-important examples of how the international economy functions. 

International trade is in all of your daily lives. The clothes you wear. Your iPhones. Your schools. Your laptops. The cars you drive. The homes you live in. What you eat. And certainly the world is in your medicine cabinets. 

This fact is undeniably true. Still, many so-called “normal people” — friends and neighbors who are not economists or political analysts, who are happy to live their lives outside of the political pressure cooker called Washington, D.C., aren’t necessarily aware of how much international trade is in their lives. Many believe what they are told by certain political leaders who know how to punch so-called “hot buttons:” that global trade is “unfair.” 

We’ll get into that next week, when we look at the political part of “political economy.” Not parochial partisan politics. Not Republicans vs. Democrats. Not “liberal” or “conservative.” Not Trump vs. Obama, although if the subject is Political Economy, such names sometimes have to come up to illustrate this-and-that.

Polls consistently show that perhaps two-thirds of Americans, year-in, year-out, instinctively believe that trade is a good thing. But the remaining third tend to fear it. 

To prepare for next week’s class, you might want to glance at two fundamental definitions that are in Economics 101 textbooks. Unless one knows better, they seem rather innocuous, boring even. But those two definitions define a subject matter that will be with you for the rest of your lives. 

The first concept is called price discrimination. The second: international price discrimination. Just take a few minutes to google them — and next week I’ll explain why those two terms are not only not boring, but absolutely essential if one wishes to understand the difficult politics of international trade. 

The first thing to understand is that anyone can grasp the fundamentals of political economy. This might be university-level principles, but they are not really difficult to grasp. If I can get it, anyone can.

That’s because my qualifications to try to explain such things are actually slim to nil. My career goes back more than a half century, to the late 1960s. 

In the beginning, I ran traditional national security investigations as a congressional aide — working for both Republican and Democratic senators and congressmen on oversight issues ranging from the security of nuclear weapons to secret intelligence operations and analyses at the Central Intelligence Agency. 

Economics was not then in the picture. After I left Capitol Hill in the1970s, I’d been to the Pentagon, State Department, and the CIA a gazillion times. But had never given the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative a thought. Nor the Departments of Commerce and Treasury, each of which has international trade responsibilities.  

For the last several decades, I’ve been a journalist who has specialized in the politics of international trade. I publish an online journal called the Rushford Report, which you can find at www.rushfordreport.com. 

I have also been an occasional contributor of columns to the Wall Street Journal, and economics magazines such as the Milken Institute Review. That publication is read by many who have doctorates in economics from the Ivy League universities in the East to the University of Chicago and onto the University of California at Berkeley. The trick in reaching even such sophisticated audiences is to grasp the basics, in clear English. 

And it turns out that even journalists like me who have absolutely no economics pretensions can grasp the fundamentals. 

A confession. I never even took economics in college. In fact, I dropped Economics 101 three times. Didn’t understand why the subject was so important. Didn’t quite trust my professors, especially one of whom was a fast-talker who wore colorful bow ties. He wanted me to assume this-or-that, when I wanted to argue why anyone should make such assumptions. When my old professor died a few years ago, the university honored him as one of its greatest teachers, ever. My role was having been his worst student, ever.

A disinterest in economics became something of a dilemma. I was an international studies major, where economics was required. I finally just switched my major to history — that’s how much I hated Econ 101. 

That was really ignorant, of course. But it took years to figure that out, until one day the economic light bulb went off. 

So basically, these three classes explain the kind of stuff that anyone can think through for themselves, if they know where to look. 

It all begins with a decent respect for facts. And some basic facts of economic life lay a solid foundation that illustrates exactly how the economic underpinnings of international trade work in real life. 

First, let’s call it the Nutella Principle, named of course for the delicious chocolate-tasting stuff that so many of us love. 

Roberto Azevedo, the director general of the World Trade Organization (WTO), explained the importance of Nutella very well in a speech a few years ago. (We’ll get to what the World Trade Organization is, and why that crucial international institution is presently under political attack in class three. For now, just trust me: the WTO is very important to your daily lives.) 

Azevedo said: “A jar of Nutella can contain hazelnuts from Turkey, palm oil from Malaysia, cocoa from Nigeria, sugar from Brazil and flavoring from China.” That’s five countries. Which one made the Nutella?

Nutella’s multinational headquarters are in a sixth country, Italy. But the Nutella jar that we Americans are likely to buy comes from one of their factories in Canada. That’s the seventh country. The finished bottle of Nutella comes into the United States labeled Made in Canada.

Next, think about where Master Lock padlocks come from. While Wakefield lockers may not use padlocks, Master Locks are famously in many, many high-school lockers nationwide. Perhaps you remember those Super Bowl commercials, showing locks tough enough to withstand bullets. 

Master Lock employs several hundred workers in Milwaukee who make “Made in the USA” padlocks. But there’s more to this, beginning with the company’s operations in places like Mexico, Taiwan, and China. Here’s how it works:

Locks have parts that come from just about anywhere: keys, cylinder assemblies, ball bearings, plated shackle stop pins, anti-saw pins, screws, and so on. One internal Master Lock company memo I found by googling on the Internet listed examples of 20 different products that Master Lock needed to get just from China. 

Another Google search showed how difficult it is to tell where a padlock really comes from. This particular lock had ten different components from various countries. The lock’s basic body was put together by American workers in Milwaukee — working with imports, including a shackle from China.

Those components from around the world were then shipped from Milwaukee to Mexico for final assembly. When the padlock came into the United States, it was labeled by U.S. Customs as a product of Mexico. Millions of normal American high school students would be unaware that their own locker rooms offer a perfect model of how international trade is in their lives.

How about Harley Davidson motorcycles? Those Hogs and Fat Boys, made in Wisconsin and Pennsylvania, are about as American as it gets, right? 

But the American workers who make the bikes couldn’t keep their jobs without access to imported components — transmissions from Japan, wheels from Australia, tires from Spain and Thailand, and so on.

Perhaps about one-third of the value of a Harley motorcycle comes from parts sources outside the United States. Harley buys the best parts it can get, at the best price, wherever they might come from, wherever at home or in the world. The economic forces that drive international trade flows are as simple as that. 

Here’s another real-life illustration of how international trade — imports and exports — works.

Boeing’s 787 Dreamliner has suppliers from everywhere. Former President Barack Obama said the following in 2012 when he visited Boeing’s manufacturing operations in Seattle: “Boeing has suppliers in all 50 states, providing goods and services like the airplane’s ground-breaking carbon fiber composite aircraft structure from Kansas, advanced jet engines from Ohio, wing components from Oklahoma, and revolutionary electrochromic windows from Alabama.” 

Take President Donald Trump’s private Boeing 757 that he used to fly around the country while campaigning for president in 2016 on his America First platform. Both Obama and Trump were cheered by audiences when they said their favorite words were “Made in America.” 

But there’s much more to Buy American politics.

Mr. Trump’s jet couldn’t have flown anywhere without those Rolls Royce 211 engines from Great Britain, for openers. The campaign audiences who cheered the Buy America appeals didn’t notice the famous RR logo on the airplane’s side. Nor did the press corps.

The bottom economic line is clear: Boeing’s airplanes come from — just about everywhere. Here’s how it works:

The Swedish National Board of Trade has published a study showing that some 70 percent of the Dreamliner’s parts come from an atlas’s worth of countries. “The wings are produced in Japan, the engines in the United Kingdom and the United States, the flaps and ailerons in Canada and Australia, the fuselage in Japan, Italy and the United States, the horizontal stabilizers in Italy, the landing gear in France, and the doors in Sweden and France.”

While Boeing makes airplanes in the United States by importing parts from around the world, Boeing also exports its aircraft to customers all over the world — notably including those in countries that supplied components. That’s why, intellectually speaking, one can’t speak of trade only in just terms of imports, or just of exports. We’ll get to the politics of that next week.

For today’s purposes, the focus is on the economics that drive the import side of the equation.

Take careful note of this: “Half of the goods the United States imports are inputs and raw materials that are necessary for U.S. companies to operate their domestic production.” That quote comes from Scott Miller, a former Procter & Gamble executive who is affiliated with an economics research project of the Center for International and Strategic Studies, a prominent Washington, D.C., think tank. 

Miller adds the obvious: such imports are “absolutely essential to the health of American manufacturing.” That means that American workers’ jobs depend upon access to the global economy. 

So, the question is: if imports are so essential to our daily lives, and our domestic manufacturing jobs are dependent upon it, why is international trade so feared and despised by many Americans?

That brings us to next week’s class — the “political” part of political economy, and why trade politics can be so difficult. Besides a few minutes of homework involved with looking up the definitions of Price Discrimination and International Price Discrimination, I’d ask that you visit my www.rushfordreport.com and search for an article from August 15, 2003, that I wrote for the Wall Street Journal: “The Politics of a Dying Industry.” You might also be able to find it via a Google search.

That column helps explain why the lives of decent, hard-working people who were brought up to work in textile mills in the American South were upended as the mills became globally uncompetitive. 

And please check out the website for the World Trade Organization. In class three we’ll talk about what the WTO does — why it is so important, and why it is now being either neglected or deliberately undermined by some key world leaders. This is the big picture. It takes some effort to understand why the WTO is so important. I suggest that anyone would benefit by plunging into the subject. 

The General Disagreement on Tariffs and Trade

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The General Disagreement on Tariffs and Trade

The system that has underpinned global trade for the past 70 years is foundering. So why is no one paying attention?

The General Disagreement on Tariffs and Trade

Nearly 70 years ago, with fresh memories of the disastrous trade wars of the 1930s, leaders of the United States and 22 other countries launched the GATT, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The GATT was charged with slashing tariffs and dismantling other protectionist barriers to global economic growth. And the Geneva-based international organization delivered. By 1995, when the GATT morphed into the World Trade Organization, a series of successful multilateral trade-liberalizing negotiations had slashed average global tariffs, which had been in the 40 percent range in the 1940s, to about 5 percent. Even though many protectionist schemes remained, the WTO seemed poised to continue the good work. But in the last two decades, the WTO has descended into dysfunction, lurching from one bitter fight to another.

A deeply concerned WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo has bluntlywarned the WTO’s 160 member countries that the GATT/WTO system has been “living on borrowed time.” He’s spot-on. I’ve been watching the GATT and its successor global trade rules-making institution for nearly four decades — witnessing the gradual destruction of the world’s most successful experiment in peaceful international economic cooperation. Although the most recent crisis that sparked Azevedo’s warnings was averted on Nov. 27, at least for now, the tensions that have weakened the WTO will remain for the foreseeable future.

The root of the problem is that too many countries either no longer believe that multilateral trade liberalization is beneficial for them, or that they lack, for varying reasons, the political will to lead.The root of the problem is that too many countries either no longer believe that multilateral trade liberalization is beneficial for them, or that they lack, for varying reasons, the political will to lead. Too many shortsighted political leaders, forgetting their history, are back in the business of creating trade blocs. They are more interested in defending their own protectionist trade schemes to fret much about what they have been doing to the WTO-supervised multilateral trading rules. And without a shared core belief that the non-discriminatory global rules work for all, the WTO cannot deliver.

In Washington, D.C., President Barack Obama has never given high priority to the WTO. Neither have Republican or Democratic leaders in Congress. While individual European WTO members like the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and Sweden still believe in the organization’s rationale, the 28-member EU makes the notion of “European leadership” an oxymoron. Tokyo’s main goal in any trade negotiation is to preserve Japan’s stratospheric 500-plus percent rice tariffs. The Chinese now run the world’s second-largest economy, but they aren’t leading either. In parts of Africa and Latin America, leaders tend to see multilateral trade liberalization as a plot for economic domination perpetuated by their rich former colonial masters. AverageAfrican tariff barriers still hover in the 12 to 20 percent range. And when it turns to former colonies that enjoy playing the spoiler, India leads the pack.

In May, India’s new prime minister, Narendra Modi, cast a gimlet eye on the only successful multilateral trade-liberalization deal the WTO had concluded in nearly 20 years of trying. Last December, when WTO members convened in Bali, India’s government (then controlled by the leftish Congress Party that Modi’s right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party trounced in this spring’s elections) signed a deal that was widely cheered. For good reason: The so-called Bali Package was guesstimated to give the global economy a trillion-dollar boost. The WTO’s richer countries pledged to provide developing countries with billions of “trade facilitation” dollars to modernize clogged ports, fix terrible roads, and streamline corrupt customs procedures. But Modi balked.

On July 31, the strong-willed Indian leader took trade facilitation hostage,refusing to sign the necessary legal protocol to implement it.

India’s veto — unprecedented in GATT/WTO history — brought the WTO into what Director-General Azevedo called a state of “paralysis.”India’s veto — unprecedented in GATT/WTO history — brought the WTO into what Director-General Azevedo called a state of “paralysis.” The good news is that after months of bitter wrangling, Modi released his veto, declaring victory.

Some victory. Essentially, India “won” the right to continue to increase the amount of subsidies that New Delhi has been lavishing upon its farmers into an indefinite future, without fears of being held legally accountable in the WTO. India’s “food security” program — paying globally uncompetitive farmers above-market prices to stockpile grains that are later doled out to the urban poor — has been widely criticized. Perhaps half the grain rots, or is sold on the black market. Meanwhile, Indian exports of surplus rice have distorted global markets for years. Undeterred by criticisms that the purpose of WTO trade negotiations is to reduce protectionism, not enhance it, Modi nevertheless claimed the high moral ground: asserting that Mother India is only fighting for the rights of the world’s poor.

The hypocrisy extends beyond agriculture. Modi has hiked tariffs on imports of high-tech equipment from other developing countries like the Philippines, Vietnam, and China. Meanwhile, India’s main goal in the WTO’s long-stalled Doha Round of broader trade liberalizing negotiations — which the Bali deal was intended to revive — is the “flexibility” to raise all industrial tariffs even more, whenever New Delhi finds enhanced protectionism politically attractive.

As it turns out, that’s basically what many African leaders also want from the WTO: the right to raise tariffs and advance their own industrial policies — while the rich countries dismantle theirs. It’s called necessary “policy space.” South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, has hardly bothered to disguise hissuspicions that the WTO’s Bali deal was tilted in favor of the rich “North.” And some officials in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya also complained that trade facilitation meant opening their borders to import competition from giant multinational corporations.

On April 27, after meeting behind closed doors, a handful of African diplomats — nobody has publicly claimed credit — persuaded the African Union to “instruct” African WTO ambassadors in Geneva to try to delay the Bali deal’s implementation. As the AU, based in Addis Ababa, hadn’t even participated in the Bali negotiations, the power play ran into intense criticism from furious Americans, Europeans, and a long list of others. The Africans subsequently backed down, but the poisonous distrust that has paralyzed the WTO’s negotiations was back.

That distrust memorably first surfaced in late November 1999, when WTO ministers convened in Seattle, hoping to launch a new round of multilateral trade-liberalizing talks. The Battle of Seattle is best remembered for the vociferous band of anti-globalist protestors (colorfully dressed as sea turtles or ninjas) who trashed that city’s streets. Less noticed were the secret smiles from key African trade officials inside the barricaded convention center who were happy that the talks failed.

In 2001, it seemed trade liberalization was on the move again when the WTO’s Doha Round was launched. But then in September 2003, there was open cheering from African officials when WTO meetings in Cancun again collapsed in acrimony. The meetings in the Mexican resort had been intended to breathe life into the Doha Round, but instead threw those negotiations into intensive care, where they still remain. (The trade-facilitation deal that was reached in Bali last December was split off from the broader Doha negotiations, the idea being to harvest the easier parts to generate momentum to complete the Doha Round.)

Just a few hours after the Cancun debacle, I ran into a Kenyan diplomat named Mukhisa Kituyi in an Argentine-style steakhouse. It was a memorable September evening in the famous Mexican resort. Kituyi and his colleagues were celebrating that afternoon’s failure of the WTO meetings, washing down copious quantities of red meat with red wine.

“We killed it,” one of the Kenyan officials boasted, referring to that afternoon’s negotiating failure.“We killed it,” one of the Kenyan officials boasted, referring to that afternoon’s negotiating failure.

Kituyi is now secretary-general of UNCTAD, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. While he declines to comment, it appears the Kenyan official remains a trade skeptic. Kituyi invited President Rafael Correa of Ecuador to deliver on Oct. 4 a rousing Special 50th Anniversary speech at UNCTAD’s Geneva headquarters, just a few blocks from the WTO’s offices along the Rue de Lausanne. Correa railed against “an immoral and unjust” world economic order. In a world “dominated by transnational capital and the hegemonic countries,” the Ecuadorian leader declared, the poor countries should protect themselves by forming regional trade accords. “The world of the future is a world of blocs,” he declared. Led by an approving Kituyi, the UNCTAD audience applauded.

This is not a trivial matter. In recent years, WTO members have cut more than 300 trade-distorting preferential trade deals with various favored trading partners. They all violate the fundamental GATT/WTO principle that member countries should not discriminate against each other. Perhaps half of global trade is diverted through these discriminatory “free trade” routes.

The top U.S. trade priorities are forming two regional trading blocs, one with Europe and the second with some Asian countries. China is excluded. Meanwhile, the Chinese are advancing their own regional trade bloc that would exclude the Americans. Many Africans are looking to their own side deals with each other.

Preventing the re-emergence of discriminatory trade blocs is exactly why the GATT was created in 1947. It’s a history lesson that present world leaders would be well advised to reflect upon.

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