Letter from Manila: Negotiating at Gunpoint

November 15, 2022

By Greg Rushford

Manila, Philippines — It’s past time to sound some national security alarm bells. The Philippines, America’s oldest treaty ally in the Pacific, has been facing economic and military pressures from China. Beijing’s bullying has been intensifying gradually for more than thirty years. The hard truth is that the Chinese are winning.

The PLA Navy — clearly contrary to international law, as determined by an international tribunal in The Hague in 2016 — has been preventing Philippine fishers from casting their nets in the South China Sea. Chinese predatory fishing in Philippine waters has been devastating to corals and other marine life, while also causing Philippine fish stocks to drop more than 60 percent. And now, adding insult to injury, China has been exporting Philippine fish it has stolen — back to the Philippines.

The same PLA Navy has been preventing the Philippines from developing much-needed oil and gas resources in Philippine waters — notably including Reed Bank, which is within the Philippines’ continental shelf and is believed to have the energy resources needed to keep the country’s electricity grids running. Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China, has given his coast guard permission to shoot to kill any Philippine exploration vessels that interfere with China’s ambitions to develop Reed Bank’s resources. Former Philippine Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio observes that Xi’s bullying “clearly violates international law.”

Xi is essentially demanding that Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. negotiate away his country’s energy independence — at gunpoint. As Eduardo Mañalac told me, because of the political risk associated with the Chinese military intimidation around Philippine oil-exploration fields, no major western market-oriented oil company will touch the Philippines. Xi is basically asking Marcos to agree to negotiate only with Chinese state-owned drilling concerns which do not pretend to adhere to international standards of financial transparency.

Mañalac is a respected former president of the Philippine National Oil Company, and a former senior official in the Philippines’ energy department. His concerns over the corrosive effects of Chinese corruption are well-taken in leading international energy circles. And in Manila’s legal circles, the scent of scandal is in the air, fueled by pending civil litigation alleging high-level governmental cronyism, and also criminal complaints alleging graft.

If Xi Jinping succeeds in intimidating the new Philippine president, who has only been in office since June, China will develop and control a key part of the Philippine energy sector. The Philippines will have been shamed — and residents of cities like Manila will have Xi to thank, every time they turn their lights on.

It’s worth looking back briefly at how one of America’s most important security allies has landed in such a predicament. Last month, I spent two intense weeks of mostly off-the-record talks with the usual journalistic sources, ranging from ordinary citizens who chafe at Chinese bullying to the higher echelons from the worlds of national security, diplomacy, politics, law, and business. The gist of what I picked up points to one bottom line: a lack of necessary political will at the presidential levels in both Washington and Manila, dating to the early 1990s.

What Happens when the Yankees Really Do Go Home

In 1991, the United States Air Force and Navy evacuated the large U.S. bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay. Volcanic eruptions from nearby Mt. Pinatubo that covered both bases in ash were the immediate impetus for the pullout. But the real reason involved insular-looking Philippine domestic politics. That, plus American stubbornness during endless negotiations over the usual suspect: money.

Then-President Corazon Aquino and some of her aides who wore anti-American chips on their shoulders had made it plain that Uncle Sam just wasn’t welcome anymore. And the Yankees, fed up with years of negotiations over basing rights that went nowhere, were happy to go home.

While over the years, the Philippines has succeeded commendably in turning the former U.S. bases into one of the most thriving hubs of economic growth in Southeast Asia. But watchful military eyes in Beijing soon perceived that the Philippines was left defenseless.

In 1995, the Philippines discovered that the Chinese navy had seized Mischief Reef, a tiny speck in the South China Sea that is part of the Philippines’ continental shelf. Chinese officials insisted that that they were just erecting fishing shelters. Manila and its neighbors in ASEAN fussed for awhile, but basically shrugged.

The PLA Navy on the Move

Visiting Manila in 1998, I saw Philippine reconnaissance photos that showed that the Chinese had erected military features on Mischief Reef, gun turrets, and such. When those photos hit the Manila papers, there was a public outcry (at least involving ordinary Filipinos, if not so much business elites with their eyes on doing business with a rising China).

Meanwhile, officials in then-President Bill Clinton’s State Department were not much bothered. Don’t worry: China lacks the resources necessary to project real military power, I was told.

The Clinton White House was busy extending a helping hand to a mainland China that wanted to get back on its feet and join the market-oriented global economy, after decades of economic mismanagement by the Communist Party of China. Clinton saw a potential peaceable economic partner, not a strategic rival-in-waiting.

From 2001 to 2008, the drift continued. President George W. Bush, his hands full with Iraq and Afghanistan, never seemed to focus on the future dangers associated with Chinese mischief in the South China Sea.

As had his predecessor Clinton, Bush welcomed China into the World Trade Organization in 2001. Inside WTO headquarters in Geneva, China quickly assumed the mantle of a responsible participant in multilateral negotiations, including those aimed at persuading governments to slash subsidies to their fishing fleets that were engaged in illegal fishing. But on the high seas, the Chinese fishing fleets kept doing ever more environmental damage. By 2016, marine biologists were warning that the South China Sea’s fish stocks were heading toward collapse.

An American President Blinks

By the time President Barack Obama, who sat in the Oval Office from 2009-2016, completed his eight years in office, the PLA Navy had taken near-total control of the South China Sea.  

The PLA Navy, of course, had its eyes on much more than fish. The story is now as familiar as it is disconcerting: how the Chinese created artificial islands out of white sand and coral in Philippine Exclusive Economic Zone. What were once half-submerged specks in the sea are now modern Chinese naval and air bases. Mischief Reef, Fiery Cross, and Subi Reef have hardened runways for jet fighters, sophisticated radars, jamming equipment, lasers, anti-aircraft missile launchers, and more.

The United States Navy, which specializes in conventional surface warfare — but isn’t so adept at waging political warfare — watched America’s former military dominance of the South China Sea slip away. Beijing’s weapons of choice were a mixture of the usual sleight-of-hand: propaganda and disinformation proclaiming Chinese good intentions, sand dredgers, and coast guard ships that were accompanied by swarms of maritime militia “fishing” fleets. 

While all this was underway, Xi assured China’s neighbors that his military would not weaponize the South China Sea. That was, of course, a lie.  But the disinformation worked. As Seth Jones has written, China took the South China Sea “without firing a shot.”

Obama watched all this happen. He promised senior Philippine officials I’ve spoken with that America would not just stand idly by. But that’s what he did.

Washington Starts to Pay Attention

It wasn’t until 2020 that an American secretary of state, Michael Pompeo, working with David Stillwell, a respected Asian hand who headed State’s East Asian Affairs bureau, stated publicly that the United States recognized that the Chinese maritime aggression was in violation of international law. Last month in Manila, I was reminded several times how welcome that statement was. The State Department had signaled that America was starting to get serious about protecting its friends in the Pacific.

Indeed, in April 2020, the U.S. Navy helped Malaysia fend off Chinese Coast Guard and maritime militias, which were trying to bully the Malaysians out of exploring for oil and gas in Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone.  This is still being talked about in Manila’s national security circles.

As Philippine investigative reporter and author Marites Vitug has noted approvingly, “three American warships and an Australian frigate conducted a joint exercise near the site” of Malaysia’s exploration activities. Vitug also pointed out that when faced with such resolve, the Chinese intruders backed off.

I still cannot report that America has yet put into operation what could be called a truly sophisticated political-military-diplomatic maritime strategy. But some steps in the right direction have continued on President Joe Biden’s watch.

Last month, to cite just one of several recent encouraging developments, U.S. Ambassador to the Philippines MaryKay Carlson announced that “the United States has now made available $100 million in foreign military financing in part for the Philippine military to use as it wishes.”

Searching for Presidential Political Will in Manila

But how does one help an ally who lacks the political will to defend its own sovereignty? Former Philippine President Benigno Aquino, Jr. clearly had the necessary determination to stand up to Chinese bullying. In 2013, Aquino filed a challenge in The Hague, asserting that Chinese aggression in the South China Sea violated Beijing’s obligations as a signatory to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. And on July 12, 2016, Aquino’s move became a resounding success, when an UNCLOS tribunal ruled that China had acted illegally. It was “an overwhelming victory for the Philippines,” as Greg Poling noted in his recent, very well-received book, On Dangerous Ground.

“The judges agreed that China had illegally destroyed the marine environment through clam harvesting, intentionally created the risk of collision [with] foreign ships, and prevented the Philippines from accessing the resources of its EEZ and continental shelf,” Poling wrote.  Moreover, “they berated China for building artificial islands while the arbitration was underway.”

But there was one problem with the tribunal’s finding: it was issued twelve days after Rodrigo Duterte had succeeded Aquino as president. And it turned out that Duterte, a man who enjoyed projecting an image of a tough guy in the political arena, wasn’t so tough after all when it came to standing up to bullies in Beijing. The Philippine “strongman” refused to enforce his country’s legal victory — leaving Philippine fishing communities hanging, and potential oil and gas exploration, especially in Reed Bank, subject to the PLA Navy’s intimidation.

Just one 2018 press release issued by the historically weak Philippine Coast Guard showed the atmosphere of subservience that Duterte nourished.

Duterte and Xi Jinping had signed a maritime cooperation agreement, the release noted. So the Philippine Coast Guard had gotten busy making friends with China’s Coast Guard.  Translation:  that meant that the two coast guards bonded when they got together in Guangzhou.  Readers who have ever experienced Chinese hospitality will have already imagined the partying and entertainment.

Afterwards, the Philippine Coast Guard issued a press release that celebrated its fraternal ties with the same Chinese Coast Guard that had taken control of Philippine fishing grounds. “The two sides noted the positive outcomes of the bilateral relations and expressed their willingness to further deepen cooperation by conducting port visits, joint exercises, personnel exchange and training, and utilization of hotline communication,” the Philippine press release enthused. 

The Philippine Coast Guard now has new leadership said not to be subservient to China. Whether that’s true or not, a Coast Guard spokesman told me last month that he was not authorized to talk about Chinese maritime aggression.

Political Risk

Meanwhile, on Duterte’s watch, Philippine government officials close to him allegedly pressured two American oil majors, Shell and Chevron, to sell their shares in the Philippines’ Malampaya gas field to a crony of Duterte’s who has a reputation of being pro-Chinese. This was “extremely suspicious,” notes Eduardo Mañalac, the former president of the Philippine National Oil Company.

Malampaya is important for two reasons. It supplies perhaps 40 percent of Manila’s electric grid. And it is running out of gas reserves, which makes future exploration on Reed Bank, and elsewhere very important.

Mañalac is not the only reputable Philippine critic of the Malampaya sale. Reuben Torres, a well-regarded former executive secretary to former Philippine President Fidel Ramos, is pressing litigation that alleges that the transaction was of dubious legality. 

And the Philippines’ Office of the Ombudsman is reported to be looking into separate charges that the Malampaya transaction was criminal. 

Whatever the truth, the whiff of political risk is hanging in the political air that Ferdinand Marcos, Jr., the new Philippines president known better as “Bong Bong Marcos,” has inherited. The message to international oil majors is that Philippine energy sector is tilted in favor of Xi and the PLA Navy. Such a lack of a level playing field explains why only the Chinese government has expressed interest in exploring for oil in Chinese-controlled Philippine waters.

So how will this story end? The answer depends upon how Bong Bong Marcos responds to the bullies from Beijing.  As Greg Poling has observed, while the Chinese have been winning, they haven’t yet “won.”  

I believe that despite the previous years of mistakes in Washington, involving both Democratic and Republican presidents, the new Philippine leader will have America’s backing — if he genuinely wants it.

Stay tuned.

Collaborator

 Last week marked some memorable history being made — and some key dates perhaps fraught with deeper historical significance than either Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte or China’s Xi Jinping would care to be reminded of.

On Oct. 17, Xinhua reported that the president of the Philippines — then enroute for an official state visit to China — had admitted he would not fight for his country. “There is no sense in going to war” to recover Philippine territory that Chinese forces have seized in the South China Sea, Rodrigo Roa Duterte had declared. “There is no sense fighting over a body of water.” Also on Oct. 17, Duterte told Hong Kong’s Phoenix Television that he wanted to hold war games with China — and no longer with the Philippines’ longstanding treaty ally, the United States. “I have given enough time for the Americans to play with the Filipino soldiers,” he said.

On Oct. 20, speaking in the Great Hall of the People, Duterte delivered on what he had promised would be the “defining moment of my presidency,” sticking the knife into the Americans. “In this venue, your honors, in this venue, I announce my separation from the United States.” Duterte went on to say this: “I’ve realigned myself in your ideological flow and maybe I will also go to Russia to talk to [President Vladimir] Putin and tell him that there are three of us against the world — China, Philippines and Russia.” America, he added, “has lost.”

Also on Oct. 20, a triumphant-looking President Xi delivered his part of the bilateral bargain. In return for the Philippine president’s willingness to look the other way regarding Chinese naval- and air bases in the South China Sea, Beijing would start delivering more than $13.5 billion of soft loans and an array Chinese-controlled joint development projects to fill Duterte’s begging bowl.

Professor Erwin Tiongson of Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service and a man with a keen historical eye, helps put last week’s chronology in a fitting context. October 20, as Duterte was venting his scorn for Americans in Beijing, marks the 72nd anniversary of Gen. Douglas MacArthur’s landing in Leyte. Five months later, a future President Rodrigo Roa Duterte would be born into freedom — on the island of Leyte.

The historical record is silent — and Duterte himself has not responded to a written invitation to clarify it — on how his parents, Vicente Duterte and Soledad Roa Duterte, might have celebrated when the Americans freed them from foreign aggression. We don’t know (yet) whether Vicente and Soledad were among the brave Filipino patriots who harassed Japanese forces on Leyte and passed valuable intelligence on to the U.S. Sixth Army — or whether they, like others, were collaborators. But we know what to call the son, who has admitted he is eager to look the other way in the face of foreign aggression, in return for money.

Also on Oct. 20, while Duterte was venting his spleen against Americans in the Great Hall of the People, the U.S. Embassy in Manila dispatched Col. Kevin Wolfla to Leyte. The decorated U.S. Army attaché spoke to an audience in the town of Palo that had gathered to mark the 1945 Leyte Gulf landing. “Our relationship with the Philippines is broad and our alliance is one of our most enduring and important relationships in the Asia-Pacific region,” Col. Wolfla (rightly) noted. “It is a cornerstone of stability for over 70 years.”

The Philippines News Agency reported that Leyte Gov. Dominico Petilla “repeatedly thanked the US for its role in the Philippines’ liberation and massive assistance of the US government after super typhoon Yolanda.” The governor’s mother, Palo Mayor Remedios Petilla, “assured that US officials will always be invited in future Leyte Gulf Landing celebrations,” the news report added.

Seventy two years after the landing that set the stage for the largest naval battle in history — and the liberation of the Philippines, Filipinos still mark the date with a MacArthur Landing Memorial National Park. And it turns out that President Duterte has a most personal reason to remember American sacrifices for his country. But for reasons that have yet to be explained, Rodrigo Duterte’s historical memories are shorter.

Duterte was born on Leyte on March 28, 1945. While his mother was giving birth, Japanese forces sunk an American submarine, the USS Trigger, which had been patrolling in Japanese waters. Eighty-nine Americans under the command of CDR David Rickart Connole lost their lives that day. The Trigger had already sunk “at least fifteen enemy vessels for a total of more than 85,000 tons of shipping,” according to the United States Navy Submarine Force Library and Museum, in Groton, Connecticut. Motor Machinist’s Mate First Class Constantine Guinness, one of the Trigger’s intrepid men, had captured the Trigger’s spirit with a poem: “I’m the Galloping Ghost of the Japanese Coast.”

The names of the Trigger’s crew are also remembered in the missing-in-action memorial in the USS Bowfin Submarine Museum and Park, in Honolulu, Hawaii. Duterte’s foreign secretary, Perfecto Yasay — who has also been busy expressing his disdain for Americans these days — was living in Hawaii with his family when his old friend Duterte tapped him for the Department of Foreign Affairs. As I reported in a column published on ForeignPolicy.com on Oct. 17, Yasay has professional ties to Filipino-Chinese tycoons with high-level connections in Beijing.

Duterte has not responded to questions as to whether he has ever been to the American Cemetery in Manila. Tucked away on 152 peaceful green acres, the cemetery honors the memories of the 16,632 Americans and 570 brave Filipinos who are buried there — and whose lives will be eternally marked by their sacrifices to free the Philippines from foreign occupation. There is also a chapel and a memorial honoring 36,285 Americans, Filipinos and other members of the allied armed forces who were killed in action — including the eighty-nine Americans from the Trigger who died the day Duterte’s mother gave birth.

There are other dates worth contemplation as the Duterte presidency continues down its anti-American path. But one stands out.

On September 9, 1945, Japanese forces surrendered in China. President Xi Jinping and other senior members of the Politburo like to pretend that China’s armed forces threw out the Japanese. The chest thumpers in today’s Beijing are loath to acknowledge that Americans, Australians, British, New Zealanders, Canadians and others also had their hands in that victory, to understate the matter considerably.

The missing date in the chronology is the time that China helped another country secure its liberty, at the cost of considerable Chinese lives. That’s because such a historical event has yet to happen.

Tone Deaf

 If war is too important to be left to the generals, as Georges Clemenceau famously said, it is unwise to leave important international economic decisions to technicians who fail to connect them to broader U.S. national security priorities. This story concerns one such decision that was announced by U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman on June 30. It immediately became the subject of heated controversy in Washington’s international trade circles.

It’s not difficult to see why.

Froman — characteristically — crafted his decision in excessive secrecy. An exhaustive research of the available public record turns up no economic evidence to support it. Pressed hard to defend it, Froman has been unable to point to any serious economic rationale. The intended beneficiaries, mainly in Sub-Saharan Africa, are not positioned to take advantage of it.

Meanwhile, important U.S. trading partners across Southeast Asia and the Indian Subcontinent that could benefit — from the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia to Pakistan, Sri Lanka and India —instead will be hurt. Diplomats from 14 of the affected countries just yesterday sent a strong letter to Froman bluntly expressing their “disappointment” concerning U.S. economic discrimination against them. The signatories included Brazil, Tunisia, Moldova, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and Paraguay. Privately, diplomats I’ve spoken with express their frustrations with the inequities of U.S. trade policies in, well, much stronger language.

The unusually strong criticisms would surprise a casual reader of Froman’s June 30 press release. On the surface, at least, it appeared to be a shining example of American generosity aimed at helping the world’s least-developed countries. The Obama White House, declared Froman, wanted to make “a powerful contribution to lifting people out of poverty and supporting growth in some of the poorest countries in the world, while also reducing costs to American consumers and businesses.”

But will it? More than two weeks of weeks of intensive independent research — including repeated efforts to obtain Froman’s side of the story — suggests otherwise.

Let’s take it from the top:

The intended beneficiaries are African countries like Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana, Lesotho and Kenya, and also impoverished Cambodia and Haiti. They will be given preferential access to the $5 billion U.S. market for travel goods: think suitcases, handbags, wallets, and backpacks. No longer will their exports of 28 lines of handbags and such face U.S. tariffs that range from 4.5 percent to a stiff 20 percent. (Last year, Congress authorized adding travel goods to developing countries eligible to participate in the Generalized System of Preferences program, and for the 40 member countries of the African Growth and Opportunity Act.)

The entire American travel goods industry was blindsided. To understate the matter, the executives who actually make the investment decisions were not thrilled that federal officials with scant business experience would think that they knew more than the CEOs about where their future travel-goods investments should be directed. Outraged, the American Apparel & Footwear Association, the Outdoor Industry Association, the Sports & Fitness Industry Association, and the Travel Goods Association, have been demanding that Froman explain his decision, so far without success.

Comparing the June 30 Froman press release with the realities of the $5 billion U.S. travel-goods market sheds light on the emotions the U.S. trade negotiator has unleashed.

First, Froman’s determination does not appear to make anything close to a truly “powerful contribution to lifting people out of poverty,” and does not seem to be supported. Most of the intended beneficiaries, alas, have precious few travel goods to export, so the US preferences won’t help them much.

At least Cambodia, with 0.4 percent of the US market, does have a small-but-vibrant travel-goods industry, apparently mainly involving backpacks, that stands to benefit. So the Cambodians are poised to be winners. Still, Cambodia’s ambassador to the United States, Chum Bunrong, signed the July 18 letter from 14 countries expressing concerns about the discriminatory treatment. Cambodia had sought the GSP preferences, but had not lobbied to exclude other deserving countries.

Meanwhile, the Africans, the major intended beneficiaries, simply aren’t important players in the travel-goods industry. They aren’t positioned to become such anytime in the foreseeable future. All of Africa’s travel-goods exports to the United States amount to a roughly one hundredth of one percent market share.

There is (happily) some foreign investor interest in developing the African travel-goods industry, involving as much Chinese as U.S. and European multinationals. But (unhappily) not much. Stiff U.S. tariffs aren’t the main problems — clogged ports, bad roads, red tape, and too many other economic inefficiencies to list in one line are far more important obstacles to viable African trade expansion.

The Africans also have been slow to take advantage of the generous trade-facilitation financial assistance pursuant to the World Trade Organization’s so-called Bali Package aimed at smoothing the flow of goods across presently difficult borders. The WTO inked its trade-facilitation deal when ministers met on the famous Indonesian resort island in December 2013. To date, only eleven African WTO members have ratified it. One struggles to find a sense of economic urgency.

Moreover, making backpacks, for instance, with all their zippers and complex components, is far more difficult than making T-shirts. Yet even with 15 years of duty-free access to the U.S. clothing market under the African Growth and Opportunity Act, all of Africa’s apparel exports to the U.S. still only amount to about $1 billion annually. That’s less than one percent of the U.S. clothing market.

The Philippines, one of the smaller exporters of garments to the United States, exports about $1.1 billion worth of clothing to the U.S. annually. That’s roughly $100 million more than the yearly garment exports from all of the Africa countries combined. And Bangladesh’s US clothing exports are more than five times Africa’s total.

The Africans get duty-free treatment for their garment exports pursuant to the African Growth and Opportunity Act. But the Philippines, Cambodia, Bangladesh, and the rest of the world’s rag trade face stiff U.S. clothing tariffs. Those tariffs mainly hover in the 12- 16 percent range, but can shoot sharply higher. The unavoidable economic bottom line: African countries that struggle just to make shirts and trousers, even with the existing AGOA duty-free preferences, are not poised to attract major investments in travel goods.

Consider further the June 30 Froman press release’s boast of “reducing costs” for American consumers and businesses by slashing tariffs on travel goods for Africa. Driving up costs by upending multi-million dollar investment plans of major players in the industry — like Coach, Michael Kors, Under Armour, Columbia Sportswear, and Kate Spade — is more like it.

That’s because such stalwarts of the American travel-goods industry have been planning to enhance their investments in the countries which are poised to take advantage of them, mainly the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and India. The U.S. industry leaders have been aiming to shift production to such developing countries away from China, which holds an estimated 85 percent of the U.S. market. But now, that production will mostly remain in China — ironically making the Chinese the biggest winners of the U.S. trade representative’s decision.

Vietnam holds another 5 percent of the American travel-goods market. As a communist country, the Vietnamese are not eligible to participate in the American GSP preference program. But Froman has agreed in the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal to give Vietnam the same duty-free treatment for the same 28 tariff lines of travel goods. Put another way, U.S. trade policy has been shaped to carve out at least 90 percent of the American travel-goods market to two communist countries: China and Vietnam.

Meanwhile, the losers in Southeast Asia and the Indian Subcontinent will just twist in the proverbial wind. Froman’s June 30 announcement did not flat-out deny such developing countries the GSP duty-free preferences. Rather, the U.S. trade chief has said he is merely “deferring” their petitions into an indefinite future before deciding whether they deserve them. The government-induced market uncertainty, of course, is a nightmare scenario for any investor whose plans are thrown into limbo.

Do the math: Froman and President Obama will leave their offices in six months. It takes perhaps 18 months after an investment decision is made to get a travel-goods factory up-and-running. So assuming that such an investment plan were to be made this week, we’re looking at early 2018 before, say, a travel-goods operation would be established in, say, Rwanda. Then it would take another several years before export data would be generated. U.S. trade officials might be able, sometime after the 2020 presidential election, to start a lengthy review process. Imagine how the CEO of a major U.S. multinational would feel about that.

And imagine how poor women in places like the Philippines — a country of 100 million people, some 25 million of whom are suffering in poverty — might feel about the June 30 U.S. trade action that put equally deserving African workers’ interests ahead of theirs, should someone ask their opinions. (To their credit, the Africans did not ask that workers in other poor countries be excluded from the US travel-goods decision.)

Ironically, on June 30, as Froman was releasing his press release in Washington, the Philippines was swearing in a new president. Rodrigo Duterte has not been shy about the fact that over the years he has developed a certain attitude toward perceived American high-handedness.

President Duterte comes from the southern Philippine island of Mindanao. He and some of his key economic and security advisors have seen this sort of discriminatory behavior from Washington before. For years, Washington officials have refused to consider slashing high U.S. tariffs that would boost the economic prospects of (mostly Muslim) workers in Mindanao’s canned tuna industry. This is another example of how U.S. economic policies can be disconnected from important diplomatic priorities to win trust in the Islamic world.

And more recently, U.S. trade chief Froman has even turned a deaf ear on Philippine requests that garment workers in typhoon-ravaged areas be given duty-free treatment for their clothing exports to the United States. While this might be a largely symbolic gesture in the grand scheme of things, America would be highly praised for showing such generosity. Instead, on the very day he was sworn into office, President Duterte was greeted by still another example of American ungenerous economic thinking.

The Philippine travel-goods industry had been looking to create an additional $100 million in annual exports to the United States — that’s $500 million in five years, involving some 75,000 new jobs. Now U.S. Trade Representative Froman has put those aspirations on indefinite hold.

The Philippines is also one of America’s closest treaty allies, and sits astride sea lanes in the South China Sea that are of vital importance to global commerce. But the Chinese have an agenda that would put Beijing in charge of Philippine waters.

On July 12, Beijing’s claims to economic domination in the South China Sea were branded illegal by a well-crafted international tribunal’s ruling in The Hague. But while seriously embarrassed, the Chinese have other cards to play. They are infamous for their special brand of economic diplomacy (suitcases full of money).

China’s top leaders have made it no secret that they will try to offer financial inducements to the new Duterte administration. Meanwhile, the US travel-goods announcement has given Filipinos another reason to doubt America’s trustworthiness as an economic partner. Sometimes in international economic diplomacy, as in personal life, it’s the smaller slights that do the most to fray relationships.

Pakistan, although hardly a trusted ally like the Philippines, is nevertheless another country that is important in the U.S. national security equation. Now the Pakistanis must wonder how truthful President Obama was to their prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, when Sharif visited the White House last year.

On October 22, 2015, Sharif and Obama issued a joint statement that took note of the “importance” of increased “market access’ for Pakistan in the GSP preferences program. “President Obama indicated that the United States will help Pakistan create conditions for accelerated trade and investment-driven growth,” the statement noted. Now, Froman’s June 30 decision to defer Pakistani hopes for duty-free treatment regarding travel goods raises more questions about American sincerity.

Not everyone is unhappy with the U.S. trade representative. Stephen Lande, the president of a respected Washington consulting firm, Manchester Trade, has had many years of experience with Africa. “I am happy” that Froman decided to give African countries preferences on travel goods, Lande says. “Because that’s what AGOA is all about.”

Lande says that he hopes that Froman’s decision will encourage CEOs in the travel-goods industry to put more money into Africa. Countries in Southeast Asia like the Philippines could acquire the same GSP benefits by joining an expanded TPP trade pact, Lande adds.

Froman, meanwhile, is hunkered down. He refused to allow the U.S. trade officials who worked on the case to explain an economic rationale for his June 30 announcement. He wouldn’t even say which office handled the paperwork (apparently the economic-policy shop run by Assistant U.S. Trade Representative Edward Gresser). The organization chart at the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative — who reports to whom, and on what — is considered classified information.

When I pressed, Froman finally asserted through a spokesman, Trevor Kincaid, that “travel goods are a product particularly well-suited to be produced in least-developed countries.”

Will that be the last word? Stay tuned.